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SQUARE PEGS & ROUND HOLES: FITTING MODERN
TITLE INTO TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES IN INDONESIA
Timothy Lindsey t
Abstract: In Indonesia, diverse interests in land recognised by dozens, maybe
hundreds, of different adat (traditional customary legal systems) coexist with a Dutchderived system of land title. The most problematic adat interest is traditional communal
title, or hak ulayat. Indonesia's New Order government sees adat rights-and hak
ulayat in particular-as incompatible with the demands of economic development.
Although some adat rights are recognised in the key statute regulating interests in land,
the Basic Agrarian Law, the New Order government has systematically subverted the
standing of adat. Likewise, the land registration system has become a corrupt failure,

with the consequence that only around ten percent of all rural land is registered.
Generally speaking, adat title is vulnerable to arbitrary confiscation by the state and
land disputes have become highly politicised. While the Land Administration Project,
funded by foreign donors, aims to encourage increased registration and protect adat

landholders, it does not take into account the reality of political exploitation of
traditional rights in Indonesia. There is a real danger that it will compound the
problems of these landholders and hasten the demise of traditional land laws that are
well suited to a plural society with diverse traditional communities.

It is not adat regulationsthat are an obstacle to development,but the main obstacle is our pigeon-holed thinking. If it is true
that we have had difficulty in obtaining land ... it is the result
of excessive tunnel vision which has destroyed a system of
values[,]
the compact between grandparents and
grandchildren and hence between the government and its
people. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over centuries, Indonesia has developed a complex plural 2 legal
system to cope with the extraordinary diversity of cultural, ethnic, and
economic activity in the three hundred or so inhabited islands of this

archipelagic state. Today, at least twenty (and perhaps as many as three
I
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' Anas SH, in Rachel Haverfield, Hak Ulayat and the State: Land Acquisition and Law in
Indonesia, in LAW & SOCIETY IN INDONESIA (Timothy Lindsey ed., forthcoing 1998).
2 See generally M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEOCOLONIAL LAW (1975).
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hundred) 3 distinct indigenous legal systems based on adat, or traditional
customary law, 4 co-exist. They include laws derived from origins as diverse
as syariah, or Islamic law, animist beliefs once common to most Southeast
Asian cultures in the Dong Son period, as well as Hindu and Buddhist
traditions, still dominant in traditional cultures in Bali today. Parallel to these
indigenous legal sources are surviving Dutch colonial laws and an everexpanding body of legislation and regulation introduced since the
proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945.
Unsurprisingly, land use law in contemporary Indonesia involves an
overlapping mixture of laws from all these sources. The intricacies of the
interaction of these many and varied legal sources, and, more particularly, the
consequences of transactions between persons subject to different legal
systems, is determined by a complex body of jurisprudence known as hukum
antargolonganor "intergroup law," an area into which lawyers only venture
reluctantly.
Generally, however, urban transactions are governed by
Western-style laws. Transactions in rural areas, where approximately sixtytwo percent of Indonesia's 200 million people live, 5 usually remain subject to
local adat.
This situation is complicated by the operation of the Basic Agrarian
Law of 1960 (the "BAL"). This statute introduced a new system of land
rights intended to absorb and replace both existing European rights inherited
from the Dutch and adat interests. A new group of Indonesian umbrella
categories was created under the BAL, and although these categories purport
to be based on adat values, they obviously reflect Western models. The BAL
also introduced a system of land registration intended to allow gradual
certification of these interests so that, in time, registered title would replace
the current cocktail of registered European land and largely unregistered but
theoretically registrable adat land.
As will be seen, the BAL's land reforms have largely failed, mainly
land administration into a bureaucratic rentier activity. The other causes
include significant inadequacies in the scope of the statute itself and, perhaps
3
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most importantly, the extraordinary resilience of adat. Today only around ten
percent of registrable land in rural areas-that is, in many cases, areas often
still dominated by adat, have been registered. It is perhaps even more
eloquent testimony to the BAL's failure that even in urban areas, the level of
registration is only as high as twenty percent.6 In these circumstances,
experts estimate that it will take at least a century, at best, to register every
parcel of land in Indonesia.7
In 1981, the Indonesian government introduced a programme to
increase registration of land, known as Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria
("National Agrarian Operational Project") or PRONA. This initiative focused
on reducing costs and the notorious inefficiencies and corruption that had
turned land registration into a Byzantine, expensive, and extremely slow
process. PRONA has not been a success.
More recently, the World Bank funded the Indonesian Land
Administration Project ("LAP"). This gigantic endeavour has two main
objectives, first to register titles in Java and various settled areas; and
secondly to attempt registration of land in selected adat areas as a pilot for a
future conversion of all registrable land. 8 The latter part of this project is to
be accompanied by air mapping as the initial stage of another project-a
complete cadastral survey of the archipelago, something which all parties
agree is necessary, but beyond the scope of the LAP. The LAP is therefore
intended as the first step towards the ultimate aim shared by the World Bank
and the Indonesian government of resolving the problems of the BAL. By
completely replacing adat land with registered title, it is hoped certainty will
be delivered to Indonesia's land market. The assumption underlying these
policy objectives-an assumption common to both the Indonesian
government and the World Bank-is that adat title is inherently inconsistent
with modernity and is an impediment to development.
This Article. will consider the policy imperatives informing the Land
Administration Project and its likelihood of success in the light of broader
issues relating to the tensions between development and tradition in land use
in Indonesia. Parts II and III examine the development of adat and, in
particular, communal title and Indonesian government hostility toward
traditional land rights. Part IV traces the failure of legislative reforms that
were intended to replace the diversity of Indonesian land rights with a single,
integrated system that reflects adat principles. In fact, these reforms have
6
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only eroded adat rights and increased uncertainty of title, particularly for
traditional communal titleholders. In Part V, the author argues that the
current crisis in land titling in Indonesia is a product of the link between the
ideology of the development and the political legitimacy of the Suharto
Government, with the consequence, explored in Part VI, that the LAP is
fundamentally misconceived. The New Order Government has been able to
exploit the good intentions of foreign donors in its longstanding campaign
against adat land rights. In conclusion, the author argues first that the aim of
eradicating adat is unachievable while Indonesia is a plural society of widely
various economic and cultural groups; and secondly that, in any case, adat is
a reasonable system of land regulation in so diverse a society.
II.

ADAT IN GENERAL

Adat is largely unwritten. As with myths, local history, and folklore, it
forms part of the oral history of most ethnic groups in the archipelago.
Protean and dynamic in nature, it changes as the society which uses it
changes. As one Minangkabau adat maxim has it: "If the river is in spate,
the washing place is shifted. With a change of rajah comes a change of
adat."9 Rather than being essentially prescriptive of social norms as is most
Western law, adat is to a greater extent reflexive. In other words, its content
is a series of descriptions of what a particular community does, as much as it
is a set of commands about what members of the community should do. For
these reasons, any written recension of adat can become outdated in a
relatively short time.
The content of adat as it relates to land can and does vary significantly
within relatively short distances, as do local cultures and beliefs in Indonesia.
Within a few hundred miles the dominant adat may alter from, for example,
Islam to Hinduism, matrilineal to patrilineal inheritance, or from communal to
individual title. The Minangkabau people of Western Sumatra, for example,
are strongly Muslim, but practice matrilineal inheritance, although syariah
prescribes inheritance through the male line. Communal title is still relatively
commonplace in their region. Their neighbours a few hundred miles to the
north, the Batak people, are divided into Muslim (southern areas) and
Protestant Christian (northern) communities, but adhere strongly also to
ancient animist beliefs that reflect aspects of Hinduism. They have one of the
most rigidly patrilineal structures in Indonesia. The Acehnese, still further

9
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north, are more purist in their devout adherence to Islam and apply orthodox
Islamic patrilineal inheritance.
The problems of actually identifying current adat laws have been
complicated by attempts by Dutch scholars and jurists earlier this century to
create generalised codifications or summaries of the major forms of adat to
be found in what was then the Netherlands East Indies. 10 The leading Dutch
adat scholar was van Vollenhoven, whose ideas have dominated Dutch and
Indonesian legal thinking about adat for most of this century. His central
tenet was that a uniform and traditional customary law could be permanently
established in Indonesia. He identified nineteen chief groups of adat
communities which he saw as closely related to one another. These he named
adatrechtskringen (Dutch: "adat law region") or lingkungan hukum adat
(Indonesian: "adat law region"). They correspond to the following areas of
modem Indonesia: Aceh (North Sumatra); Gaye, Alas, Batak, (Sumatra);
Minangkabau (West Sumatra); South Sumatra; Malay areas; Banka and
Biliton islands; Borneo; Minahasa (East Indonesia); Gorontalo (North
Celebes); Toraja (Central Celebes); South Celebes; Ternate (East Indonesia);
Ambon; Irian Jaya; Timor; Bali and Lombok; Central and East Java and
Madura; Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Central Java); and Sunda (West Java).
By recourse to ethnographic and anthropological methods, van
Vollenhoven claimed to be able to demonstrate what he saw as primordial
commonalities among even these nineteen very disparate groups. The basic
elements of his overarching concept of adat were:
[A] preponderance of communal over individual interests, a
close relationship between man and the soil, an all-pervasive
'magical' and religious pattern of thought, and a strong familyoriented atmosphere in which every effort was made to
and mutual
compose
disputes through conciliation
consideration. "
Because modem scholarship and jurisprudence on adat still relies
heavily on the work of van Vollenhoven and other now-distant pioneers, it is
often outdated and coloured by a colonial perspective. The Indonesian courts
of general jurisdiction and the Administrative Courts hear most adat disputes
that are litigated. They still look to the attempted codifications of van
Vollenhoven and his followers for presumptions as to the nature of adat in a
10 See
77 (1966).
"

generally SurrAN TAKOIR ALISJAHBANA, INDONESIA: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL REVOLUTION 70-
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particular ethnic community. They may then hear oral evidence as to local or
historical variations to those laws before making a finding as to what adat law
applies. The courts are, however, often overly reliant on dated scholarship at
the expense of local realities.
The sheer variety of adat laws, their intimidating fluidity, and a
consequent perceived lack of certainty as to their content are the source of
what is seen as their bewildering complexity. This complexity is a common
criticism of adat in Indonesia, particularly by Indonesians who live in urban
areas and by foreign business interests (although the same comments can, of
course, be made of the common law system). Despite these criticisms, the
content of adat has always, perhaps paradoxically, been regarded as
something truly and uniquely "Indonesian." During the "Old Order" period
under President Sukarno, for example, it was widely accepted that the
commonalties van Vollenhoven identified in Indonesia's adat communities
could become the basis for universal legislation that would therefore be
intrinsically "Indonesian." Attempts at reform during this period were led by
the Lembaga Pembinaan Hukum Nasional ("National Law Development
Institute") which was responsible for developing new Codes intended to
embody adat principles.
These were intended to be expressions of
Indonesian national identity, but ironically, actually reduced the ambit of adat
law. The most notable product of this approach, both in terms of its stated
objectives and its problematic actual effect, was the BAL.
III.

THE STATUS OF HAK ULAYAT

Perhaps the most important and controversial form of adat interest
relating to land is the hak ulayat, an Arabic term used in reference to land by
the Minangkabau people of West Sumatra and now widely used as a catch
phrase for communal title. 12 By referring expressly to both hak ulayat and to
equivalent laws of "adat cnm__unities," article 3 of the RAT. makes it clear
that it intends this broad interpretation of the term.
It is accepted by Indonesian lawyers that hak ulayat is a form of what
was known in Dutch jurisprudence as beschikkingsrecht, 3 that is, a
communal right of land alienation. The essence of this right is that the
community as a whole determines how to deal with land occupied by the
"Ulayat" literally means "territory," "realm" or "jurisdiction."
" Usually translated as a "right of disposal" or "right of avail." The word was originally used by
van Vollenhoven. See SUDARGO GAUTAMA, INDONESIAN BUSINESS LAW 133 (1995)(on file with
author); See also Maria S. W. Sumardjono, Ulayat Rights and Their Recognition in the Basic Agrarian
Law, (unpublished paper presented at University of Melbourne conference, Indonesian Law: The First 50
Years, Sept. 1995) (on file with author).
12
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community. The decision is not one that can be taken by any individual
member of that community, regardless of their connection with the land. The
authority of the community in this regard extends to all aspects of use and
alienation, whether to persons within or without the community.
Generally speaking, the process of reaching consensus, usually through
community meeting and debate, is as important a feature of hak ulayat as are
the decisions that the community eventually reaches about the land. This is
because adat is predominantly concerned with maintaining or restoring the
equilibrium of the community and, ultimately, the cosmos. This goal is
usually the principal aim of those involved in settling an adat dispute in the
traditional way, rather than the allocation of individual rights and entitlements
which is the chief concern of most Western systems. It can therefore be said
that hak ulayat, like most forms of adat, is as much concerned with the
procedure for dispute resolution as it is with the disputed rights.
The magico-religious aspects of hak ulayat are part of the reason for its
profound importance for communities where it has sway. They are also
undoubtedly one of the reasons for the hostility to, or at best, lack of
enthusiasm for, hak ulayat among the policy-makers of President Suharto's
government, the "New Order" which ruled Indonesia since the mid-sixties
until 1998. They see hak ulayat as a rival of the all-pervasive national
ideology of economic development (pembangunan).
Another reason for the common disdain so often shown for hak ulayat
by the Indonesian government is its communal nature, which is fundamentally
at odds with the notion of individuation that informs Western ideas of title,
the conceptual basis of the BAL. The government view has been put
trenchantly by Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana:
If we still sometimes hear of some modem Asian intellectual
praising customary law, it must be considered the expression of
a confused man in the face of the tremendous spiritual and
material change which is taking place in Asia [or] the nostalgia
of a tired man for a more peaceful archaic society.14
A third reason for negative government attitudes toward adat is Article
33 of the 1945 Constitution, which vests control of all land and natural
resources in the state. This principle is reflected in the scheme of the BAL,
which, like the Constitution, vests control (if not ownership) of all land in

14 Sutan Takdir Alisjahabana, available in Haverfield, supra note 1.
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Indonesia in the state, that is, in practice, the President and his circle.' 5 The
principle is also manifest in The Basic Law on Forestry, No. 5 of 1967, which
essentially renders all forest land property of the state, with no recognition of
adat rights. This is an extraordinary model for forest administration, given
that forest-dwellers are precisely the groups most likely to follow adat and
hak ulayat in particular.

These provisions inform the widely accepted notion that the New
Order state ultimately can do what it pleases with land, a view confirmed by
the government's frequent and aggressive appropriation of land for
"development" purposes.
Whatever its origins, the state's hostility to adat is reflected in the
uncertain of status hak ulayat in a system that gives formal standing to other
types of adat interest in land. Specifically, Article 3 of the BAL states that
hak ulayat rights are not converted into statutory rights but are "recognised"
where still existing-provided that such rights are "adjusted to conform with
the national interest, which is based on national unity." In practice this
usually means that hak ulayat land is simply considered a form of state land,
to be disposed of by the state as its development policy dictates; in the
meantime, adat communities may occupy such land.
It is significant that the Elucidation 16 to this Article 3 states that hak
ulayat "has been an obstacle to regional development in the past." Although
almost forty years have passed since the BAL was enacted, this statement still
well reflects government policy towards communal title.
IV.

THE BASIC AGRARIAN LAW & THE

APPROPRIATION

OF 'ADAT'

The BAL gave lip service to adat as a fundamental source of
Indonesian law, land law in particular. 17 It was drafted at a time when adat
concepts were being widely appropriated by state propagandists to justify the
autocratic reinvention of the Indonesian parliamentary system as the
authoritarian "Guided Democracy" system introduced by Indonesia's first
President, Sukarno, following a Constitutional coup in 1959. Notions such as
gotong royong (community shared labour), musyawarah (consultation and
debate), and mufakat (decision by consensus) were "lifted" from traditional
cultures to support submission to the policies of Sukarno's "ongoing
is Undang-UndangPokokAgraria [Basic Agrarian Law], No. 5-1960, State Gazette No. 184-1960,

arts. 8, 27 [hereinafter BALI.
16 The Elucidation is the explanatory memorandum that accompanies Indonesian statutes and is
considered formally part of the statute.
17 This was required pursuant to a decision of Indonesia's supreme sovereign body, the Majelis
PermusyawaratanRakyat or People's Consultative Assembly. See MPRS RESOLUTION No.11/1960.
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revolution." They became slogans wielded to great effect by ideologues like
Sukarno and Ruslan Abdulgani to demonstrate both the "Indonesian-ness" of
the new political system and its supposed inevitability as an expression of the
inner psyche of the Indonesian people.
Today, this ideological appropriation of adat terminology continues,
although Indonesian politics moved sharply from the left to the right when
Suharto's New Order replaced Sukamo's Guided Democracy after 1965.
Like most products of the fashion for legal "Indonesianisation," typical of the
leftist and fervently nationalist Guided Democracy period of the first half of
the sixties, the obeisance to adat was and remains little more than rhetoric.
The BAL is expressed in its formal Elucidation as creating a national
agrarian law that provides "legal unity, simplicity and certainty to Indonesians
and prosperity, happiness and justice for the nation and people, including
farmers, on the basis of adat law." This commitment was to be achieved by
placing the needs of the community over the individual. In reality, however,
much of the BAL was little more than an exercise in reductionism. With its
implementing regulations, most notably Government Regulation No. 10 of
1960, the BAL aimed to simplify the kaleidoscopic variety of adat interests in
land by dividing them into a limited number of broad categories of registrable
interests. The drafters saw these categories as capable of embracing both
European interests in land, such as the Dutch eigendom (ownership) and
erfpacht (leasehold interest), and indigenous interests in land, such as the hak
atas druwe desa (a Balinese form of land ownership).' 8 It is clear, however,
that the categories owed more to Dutch and Western models than to adat.
Gautama and Hornick describe
recognition of adat in the BAL as merely
19
"hortatory and symbolic."'
The chief forms of registrable interest ° in land available under the
BAL include the following:
Hak milik ("Right of ownership"): This category includes Dutch
rights of ownership and similar interests held by peoples
previously identified as "Orientals" 21 and "natives" under
colonial law, together with other adat rights "resembling these."
The hak milik is roughly equivalent to the common law notion of
fee simple and may be freely alienated. 22
's

See GAuTAA, supranote 1813, at 123, 133-39; Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 183.

SuDARGo GAurAMA & ROBERT HORNICK,
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78-79 (4th ed. 1983).
20 For LAW
a complete
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list of the categories of interest, see BAL arts. 44-51.
21 "Orientals" includes Chinese, Arabs, and Indians.
22 BAL arts. 4, 20-27.
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Hakpakai ("Right of use"): This category applies to possessory
rights which do not have a "permanent quality," including adat
usufructuary rights.
This right has similarities to archaic
common law rights of usufruct and to some aspects of leasehold
interests, subject to the rights caught by the categories below.23
Hak guna usaha ("Right to exploit"): A form of agricultural
commerical lease, a right to cultivate state land, or use for other
agricultural purposes.24
Hak guna bangunan ("Right to use a building"): This category
applies to rights to use buildings and is similar to Western
residential tenancies.25
All these forms of interest in land are registrable. Although in theory
unregistered interests are of the same status as those that are registered, in
practice the latter are afforded far higher standing. Unregistered interests
tend to be regarded by the bureaucracy as a form of state land, albeit
occupied. This problem of perception is created in part by Articles 9 and 3026
of the BAL. These provide that the entities that may register relevant
interests include individual citizens of Indonesia and resident legal bodies
established in Indonesia.
This definition does not include adat
27
communities.
This gives rise to a problem in the case of hak ulayat where land is
held by the community and is not alienable by any individual without the
community's consent. The relevant regulatory body, Badan Pertahanan
Nasional ("BPN"),28 has consistently refused to allow communal registration,
arguing correctly that it can only register interests recognised at law. The
usual solution is to allow the head of the community to register interest in the
common land in his or her own name, including with the registration papers a
list of the community's members and, often, the nature of their interests. 29
This approach presents obvious and very significant difficulties. The head of
23 Id. arts. 41-43.
24 Id. arts. 28-34.
25 Id. arts. 35-40.
26 Similar provisions can be found throughout the BAL.
21 Maria S. W. Sumardjono, Hak Ulayat dan Pengakuannya oleh UPA, KOMPAS, May 13, 1993.
See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 184, n.82.

2' National Land Body.

29 Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 190.
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the community may well favour the interests of his family or supporters when
preparing the list of interests. If the list is prepared in good faith, there can be
no guarantee that the head's record of interests will be accurate. Even
assuming accuracy, problems remain. The rights of members of an adat
community may vary in nature and extent at the time of registration subject,
for example, to contribution of labour or capital; or subject to usufiuctary
rights, building rights, or a right to have a voice alienating communal land. It
is extremely difficult for these very important nuances to be reflected
accurately in the record. Likewise, the extent of an individual's interest may
vary according to his or her changing position in the community or
contribution to the land.
Fitzpatrick has described hak ulayat interests as subject to "the ebb
and flow of commitment and obligation., '30 Registration under the BAL, and
perhaps registration per se, is obviously incapable of recognising this ancient
and subtle dynamism. Given the fundamental importance of interests in land
in agricultural communities, reliance on registration to determine communal
interests in land such as hak ulayat, without any formal means of accurately
recognising and recording them, is likely to lead to gross injustice. For these
reasons, the practical solution in most rural communities is simply to ignore
the provisions of the BAL relating to registration, which is why ninety percent
of rural land remains unregistered.
The BAL has an unfortunate history of impotence. For example,
Articles 5(3), 7, 10 and 17 of the BAL provide sweeping and radical land
reforms, including the prohibition of absentee landlordism, an obligation on
the occupier to cultivate his or her own land, a prohibition on unlimited land
ownership, and the fixing of maximum and minimum land holding limits.
Bureaucrats simply refused to enforce these controversial provisions once the
BAL came into effect in the early 1960s. Attempts by what was then the
world's third-largest communist party, the Partai Komunis Indonesia
("Indonesian Communist Party" or "PKI"), to force implementation of these
reforms through aksi sepihak, "unilateral action" or land seizures, became a
key factor of confrontation in the early sixties between the PKI and the armed
This conflict eventually
forces who supported Muslim landowners.
contributed to the banning of the PKI by the military and to killings of
hundreds of thousands of leftists after a coup attempt in late 1965.
There are other good reasons for Indonesians to ignore the registration
of even registrable interests in land in Indonesia. First, under the BAL it is
not mandatory to register land except upon transfer and, even then, failure to
30 Fitzpatrick, supranote 6, at 181. See also GAUTAMA, supra note 13, at 133-34.
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register does not render the transfer invalid.3 '
Second, although the
regulations made under the BAL provide for a mechanism by which land
interests may be determined prior to registration through village committees
made up of local officials, these committees include government appointed
administrators. They do not include local adat leaders such as the ketua adat,
who in most adat communities is the elder or group of elders authorized to
arbitrate adat disputes. In other words, while the BAL purported to follow
adat principles, it effectively excluded adat processes which are arguably the
essence of adat.32
While the content of adat may be fluid and dynamic, the procedures
and methods for determining content are more stable. Universal to all adat
laws are institutional means of consensual and collective decision-making, the
essential agents that fix the balance of the equilibrium that is the ultimate aim
of adat. The substance of adat rights at any given moment are of relatively
less importance than the structures and procedures that define and implement
them.33 Yet it is precisely these processes that are excluded by the system
created by the BAL. That system relies instead on imposed decision-making
systems that are part of a corporatist modernist state's bureaucracy, and
which are therefore beholden to the government of that state for authority.
Why register and submit to this alien and famously unreliable system?
The other disincentive to registration is, of course, the complexity and
cost of the process. Despite the PRONA project, registration remains
notoriously slow, Kafkaesque in its intricacy, and is commonly exploited by
corrupt and pettifogging officials. Registration of agricultural land, for
example, will even require the signature of a regional governor. The peasant
conveying land to a neighbour will thus be obliged to obtain the written
consent of the highest authority in the relevant province.
In these
circumstances, registration of adat land can involve many years, and
expenses, both legitimate and illegitimate, which commonly consume much of
the value of the transaction. The author has witnessed cases where adat
landholders have simply abandoned sale of their land when the purchaser
insists on registration.
The quite rational result is, as mentioned, that most transactions are not
registered and most urban and rural land in Indonesia therefore remains
subject to formally unverifiable adat claims.
In turn, the predictable
consequence of this is that land disputes are common, either because there is
31 GOVERNMENT REGULATION No. 10(1961). See GAurAMA & HORNICK, supra
note 19, at 92-100;
Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 184.
32 Fitzpatrick, supra note 6.
33 HOOKER, supra note 4, at 28.
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no documentary proof of the interest claimed, or because fraudulent
certificates are issued. Similarly, "unlawful" occupancy is rife, especially in
newly settled areas where no adat authority has been established or in
urbanising areas where adat authority has broken down. Again, although
regional governors have the power to issue licenses to such occupiers, 34 this
system has been exploited by the corrupt and by unscrupulous developers
with financial or political clout.
Most importantly, perhaps, the chaotic state of land law in Indonesia
and the widespread failure of adat landholders to register their interests
means that developers tend to ignore the title system where possible and rely
instead on the government's willingness to compulsorily acquire land. In this
way, investors can skirt around the whole problem of establishing title to
land. This occurs in virtually all development projects.3 5
The irony, then, is that legislation that was intended to deliver certainty
to land title has in fact so confused matters that those it was intended to
assist, Indonesians with interests in land, are more vulnerable than they were
before the statute. Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana has argued that this was typical
of attempts to create national laws based on adat in the Guided Democracy
period. He saw the reliance on vague notions of adat as guiding principles
for statutes that, in fact, often worked to eradicate or complicate adat, as
leading inevitably to:
a hopelessly confused and tangled impasse. All clearly
defined goals were lost sight of; and any rational understanding
of the problems of law, as faced by Indonesians inthe twentieth
century, completely vanished.36

A second irony is that the state has reacted to the chaos its "reform"
has generated by helping its supporters circumvent the land laws it has
established. To repeat a common Indonesian joke, Indonesia has become
subject to the "law of the rulers" rather than the rule of law, and this is
nowhere more apparent than in the area of land use. It is here where
executive fiat and ad hoc administrative decision-making has more or less
replaced the statutory system. Why then has the Indonesian government
proved so willing to subvert its own legislative scheme?

34 Basic Law No. 1 (1961); Decree of the Minister of Internal Affairs, No. 38 (1981).

3'Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 199.
36

ALISJAHBANA,

supra note 10, at 74.

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

V.

VOL. 7 No. 3

LEGITIMACY AND 'DEVELOPMENT' AS POLICY IMPERATIVE

The New Order governments of both Presidents Suharto and Habibie
regard adat as inherently incompatible with the demands of economic
development. More particularly, they see the existence of multiple and
diverse land law adats as a disincentive to the foreign investment which funds
Indonesia's spectacular economic growth. 3

In 1997 this had reached seven

percent, a8 and average annual income had climbed to US$1,140.00 per capita
nation-wide and was four times higher in the Jakarta region. 39 The so-called
"Asian Contagion"-the currency and stock collapses in Thailand, South
Korea, and Malaysia that forced the Rupiah to fall to only twenty-five percent
of its former value in early 1998, and necessitated intervention by the
International Monetary Fund-has now cast doubt on the long-term prospects
for Indonesian development. Foreign investors have lost confidence in
Indonesia as a destination for their capital.
It nonetheless remains true that, for most of the 'nineties, Indonesia
enjoyed spectacular economic growth and this was fueled in the last
REPELITA, or Five Year Plan, by foreign investment totaling around
US$400 billion. 40 The current REPELITA is based on the now unlikely
expectation that private investors will contribute up to seventy percent of
Indonesia's planned infrastructure investment. Foreign business has been
important not only as a source of finance but also as a source of markets for
Indonesia's developing manufacturing sector. In fact, Indonesia has become
so reliant on foreign markets that threats by the United States since 1991 to
withdraw trade preferences for Indonesia under its Generalised System of
42
Preferences (GSP) 4 1 put at stake about 14.8 % of Indonesia's exports.

Foreign business's central role for Indonesia's continued development
means that high levels of uninterrupted foreign investment are also essential
to maintaining the New Order regime's political legitimacy. In ideological
37 Hal Hill, The Economy, in INDONESIA'S NEW ORDER: THE DYNAMICS OF SocIo-ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION 54-56 (Hal Hill ed., 1994).
38 ADAM SCHWARz, A NATION IN WAITING: INDONESIA IN THE
39 Pangestu, supranote 5.

1990s, 56 (1994).

40 INDONESIAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, INDONESIA: COuNTRY ECONOMIC
BRIEF 25 (1996).
41 The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. The threats related to American demands that Indonesian

labour law be brought into line with International Labour Organisation standards.

IAN FEHRING &

TIMOTHY LINDSEY, INDONESIAN LABOUR LAW UNDER THE NEW ORDER: THE M LITARY AND PROSPECTS
FOR CHANGE 7 (1995).
42 In 1991, 14.8% of Indonesia's non-oil/gas exports was worth US$642 million:
Feisal Tanjung,
The Role of ABRI in Enhancing the Implementation of Pancasila Industrial Relations, Speech to the SPSI
National Working Meeting in Bogor, (Dec. 7 1991), in FEHRING & LINDSEY, supra note 41.
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terms, the New Order tied its legitimacy to delivering ever-increasing
prosperity to Indonesians. Its rhetoric was laden with an aggressively
promoted ideology of pembangunan, or "development," which makes
economic growth the sine qua non of political orthodoxy. Suharto frequently
refered to his New Order government (born in 1965 and no longer in power)
as the "Development Order," peppering public statements with stress on the
need for orderly (tertib) and stable (stabil) development to realise progress
4 3 In other
(kemajuan) and prosperity (kesejahteraan).
words, security and
government authority are equated with economic growth and increased
personal wealth.
The Indonesian people's apparent acceptance of the rapacious selfenrichment of the governing elite and their oppressive method of government
has been a form of Faustian bargain. The evils of oppressive government are
more tolerable when the benefits of economic growth, however limited, are
tangible in everyday life, as they had been for at least the last two decades.
The importance of this unspoken political arrangement was demonstrated
clearly by the speed with which Indonesian leaders 44 began to call for
Suharto's resignation (something previously unheard of in Indonesian public
life) once the Rupiah fell, the economy seemed to be foundering, and
Suharto's side of the deal began to unravel.
In this context, the common criticism made by foreign investors that
the uncertainty and complexity of adat land law is an obstacle to development
has been a major concern to the Indonesian government, particularly
regarding investors linked to major resources, tourism, or construction
projects. Legal certainty and transparency are generally of minor interest in a
system notorious for a suborned judiciary and widespread corruption. They
become a priority only when they are seen as impeding major investment
projects and thus threatening the economic policies that underpin the
legitimacy of the government and funds the personal wealth of its elite.
The government has explicitly linked the political legitimacy of the
ruling military-business complex crafted President Suharto, a billionaire
retired General, on the one hand, with economic development, and the
eventual removal of adat as a means of regulating land use, on the other. The
controversy surrounding the government's appropriation of land for its Taman
Mini project is a good case study. Taman Mini is a huge theme-park outside
"3 For a detailed analysis of the linguistic implications of the rhetoric of development, see Virginia
Matheson Hooker, New Order Language in Context, in CULTURE & SOCIETY IN NEW ORDER INDONESIA

272-93 (Virginia Matheson Hooker ed., 1993).
44 For example, Megawati Sukarnoputeri, former leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party and
daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia's first President; and Islamic leaders, Abdurachman Wahid (Nahdlatul
Ulama) and Amien Rais (Muhammadiyah); and even Harmoko, the Speaker of the Parliament.
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Jakarta showcasing the diversity of Indonesia's ethnic groups in collections of
ersatz adat buildings and arts and crafts. It was intended as tangible evidence
of a prosperous, urban middle-class society and resembles a kitschy,
nationalist Disneyland with an expensive Imax cinema, trains, pedal-boats
and cable cars. Here museums house remnants of the adat cultures that have
been, or, it is hoped, soon will be, abandoned for global-style modem living.
Taman Mini was a pet project of the former President Suharto and his wife,
and the government pushed through the compulsory acquisition of land,
ironically held by local peasants under adat title. The project went ahead
despite widespread criticism of the acquisitions, the low level of
compensation paid, and the need for such a park. Suharto's response was
clear enough:
What was their real goal? We know what it is, and it is not the
Miniature project. Their real goal, in the short term, is to
discredit the government and President. And in the long run,
they want to kick the armed forces out of executive activities
and eliminate the dual function of the armed forces.45
VI.

WHY THE LAND ADMINSTRATION PROJECT IS MISCONCEIVED

As mentioned, the ambitious Land Administration Project is designed
to pave the way for the replacement throughout the nation of informal,
unregistered adat land with registered title. The project will begin by
registering title in Java, Bali and Sumatra, the more urbanised and densely
settled islands in Indonesia. Areas will be targeted at the Local Government
Level II (Kotamadya/Kabupaten) on the basis of expected growth.46
Attempts will also be made to survey some areas by air.
The problems the LAP faces are immense. For example, the choice of

more

dens~ely

settled

areas- as the focus of the prelimiiJnry stages of the

registration project is inherently problematic. These are areas where it could
be expected that hak ulayat, the most problematic form of adat title, is least
likely to be widespread. Indeed, some commentators argue that hak ulayat is
virtually extinct in much of Java and Bali.47 This means that the LAP pilot
project will not be dealing with the complex conditions that prevail in more
45 Available in Timothy Lindsey, Concrete Ideology: Taste, Tradition and the Javanese Past in
New Order Public Space, in CULTURE & SOCIETY IN NEW ORDER INDONESIA, supra note 43, at 166, 172.

This article provides a detailed analysis of aspects of the Taman Mini project.
46 Haverfield, supra, note 1.
41 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 182.
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remote, often-unsurveyed areas. Accordingly, the pilot program is hardly a
pilot. It may largely avoid the very issues ,that will ultimately test its worth
and that must be effectively resolved if land use in Indonesia is to be
reformed.
If the project does encounter adat land, for example in Sumatra, it will
face different but equally significant problems. It is understood that the
project will aim to record unregistered adat interests in these areas, including
formally unregistrable hak ulayat interests-indeed, the project would be
largely pointless were this not the case. As mentioned, however, records of
adat ownership of land are often oral and mythic or magico-religious in
nature. They are therefore not easily understood or recorded, no matter how
well-meaning the investigator. Further, even if community records of
communal title are located and understood, they may not fully detail interests
in hak ulayat lands. These interests are generally not clearly defined or
universally agreed upon, even among the communities that occupy the lands
in dispute. The problems are therefore as much anthropological and
ethnographic as they are cadastral and legal. The likelihood that the project
can produce an accurate survey and listing of adat interests without
substantial inaccuracies and injustices, even in the limited pilot areas, are
therefore remote. It can also be expected that these problems will be
aggravated by the deep-seated corruption endemic in the bureaucratic
administration of land in Indonesia, particularly at the village level where
those affected are relatively powerless.
The problems the LAP faces reflect broader problems in contemporary
Indonesian society.
One is the tension between government-backed
"developmentalism" and rural communities. The vast Indonesian hinterland
has benefited only marginally from Indonesia's spectacular economic success.
Rural resentment and poverty tends to politicise land issues, making them a
lightning rod for dissent
Likewise, major resources projects are invariably linked to members of
the New Order elite. The New Order has a history of pushing through major
projects to the benefit of the elite and to the detriment of local adat
communities and their land claims. Notable examples of this tendency
include the Kedung Ombo dam in Java,48 the Freeport mine in Irian Jaya, the
Taman Mini theme park in Jakarta, and the Tanah Lot condominium project
in Bali, all of which involved direct disputes between central authorities and
local communities with adat entitlements. These disputes have turned land
rights and, in particular, hak ulayat rights into volatile political issues.
41

See id at 199-202 (giving details of the Kedung Ombo case).
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This politicising of land disputes has linked rural grievances to popular
criticism of the Indonesian legal system and, more particularly, to the
corruption and cronyism with which the current government is increasingly
identified. In part, this is a consequence of Article 11 of Basic Law No. 14
of 1970, which authorised the Minister of Justice to determine judicial
appointment, promotion, salary, and dismissal. The effect of Article 11 is that
judges are politically dependent; they do not enjoy any guarantee of tenure
but effectively have the status and job security of public servants. Likewise,
although the Chief Justice is no longer formally a minister and member of
cabinet, 49 the tradition of close cooperation and consultation between the
executive and the Supreme Court bench continues. These factors have
contributed to the so-called "two-hat" controversy, whereby judges are seen
as owing conflicting duties to the government and the judiciary, at the cost of
their impartiality.5 ° In deciding cases, judges are in effect subordinate to the
Minister rather than the law, with predictable results for the integrity of their
decisions. 51 This institutionalised political collusion is matched by
widespread bribery (a reflection of low judicial salaries) and the low status
afforded judges since the Guided Democracy period began. With the
exception of some judges of the Administrative Courts, the judicial system is
seen as incapable of providing just resolutions of land disputes.
The dysfunction of the legal system means that land-related litigation
often becomes a political circus, as in the Kedung Ombo case, 52 with peasants
confronting the government with radical and dissenting critiques adopted
from urban political opposition groups. Alternatively, it can mean that the
frustrated rural poor choose the traditional rural means of expressing dissent:
rebellion and rioting. This was seen in 1996 and 1997 in bloody land-related
racial violence between Dayaks and Madurese immigrants in Kalimantan.
Since independence from the Dutch in 1945 and, more particularly,
since the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, the Indonesian government has had
a Inng traditinn nf what might h

termprl "ennrial

pnrjnp,-n,

"

Vost,,

examples include the universal adoption of a national language, bahasa
Indonesia, the virtual elimination of illiteracy, and a spectacularly successful

'9 As was the case in the Guided Democracy period.

so See Mahkamah Ali Yang Dipreteli, TEMPO, July 18, 1992 (former Chief Justice Ali Said highly

critical of government measures limiting judicial independence in 1992). Other criticisms have been
voiced by other judges of the MahkamahAgung, including Adi Andojo (discussed below), Bismar Siregar
and Muhammad Djaelai. See Courting Corruption, INSIDE INDONESIA, MRP News Service (Jan.-March

1997).

Ismail Saleh, Memorandum IKAHI, KOMPAS ONLINE, Feb. 3, 1997.
2 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 199-202 (giving details of the Kedung Ombo case).
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family-planning campaign based on the slogan "Two children are enough."' 3
More controversial examples include the transmigration of Javanese and
Madurese families to less populated outer regions such as Lrian Jaya and
Sumatra, a programme which has given rise to long-standing ethnic and
religious divisions and fuels social unrest in target rural areas such as
Kalimantan and Timor. Likewise, the extrajudicial eviction of slum dwellers
from kampung ("village") areas in inner Jakarta to make way for housing and
shopping complexes has caused deep resentment in poor sectors of urban
society. Indonesia's institutionalised ideological indoctrination programme,
which equates "development" and the ruling Javanese elite's political vehicle
GOLKAR 5 4 with the state ideology of Pancasila and "Indonesian-ness," is
also a source of subtle but growing resentment in marginalised groups
throughout Indonesian society.
However good the intentions of the World Bank, the LAP should be
viewed in the context of these elaborate attempts at social engineering. The
government's express policy and the implicit motivation of the project is to
"unify" Indonesian land law by reducing and ultimately removing any role for
adat in land titling. This is an attack on the viability of adat communities
through a re-invention of "traditional" Indonesian values that serve the state's
ends. The state has the specific intention that the communities and systems
that originally developed those values will be discarded as impediments to
"development."
These aspects of the project are socially destructive,
unnecessary, and regressive, given the slow and often painful movement back
towards a recognition of adat-style land interests in developed countries.
Indonesia's rural community has a long history of resistance to reform
and an even longer history of political instability and potential radicalism.
There can be no doubt that the land titling project will eventually give rise to
disputes, if not in the course of implementing the project pilot, then certainly
in the future when information obtained through the pilot is actually tested.
These disputes will take legal form and could translate quickly into political,
cultural, and, ultimately, social conflicts of major significance for the
Indonesian state.
The growing gulf between the more affluent and
"modernised" urban population and the increasingly impoverished
"traditional" rural masses is at the heart of differences over how to deal with
53 Dua anak cukup.
14
Golongan Karya, literally, "Functional Group," GOLKAR was, under Suharto, the government's

political party although it was officially a social grouping rather than a political party. This distinction
allowed it to avoid the prohibitions on campaigning between elections, etc., that restricted activities of the
only two legal political parties, the Partai Democrasi Indonesia, the Indonesian Democratic Party
(Christian and nationalist) and the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the United Development Party

(Muslim).
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land and, more particularly, adat title. The former are backed by the state, as
In Indonesia,
is usually the case when "development" is involved.
"development" has generally been read as code for the political and economic
dominance of the Presidential family and their circle. In this sense, disputes
over adat land are debates about the future of the Indonesian state itself and
the value of current policies. A sense of resentment and frustration in land
disputes has made them a tinderbox in a time of political tension.
The Land Administration Project is fundamentally based on yet another
of the many bitter ironies that typify the present state of Indonesian land law.
The World Bank sees the project as empowering poor, rural communities by
giving them clearly defined, title. With their interests protected, rural
communities will be better able to obtain financing and ultimately claim a role
in the sustainable development of rural resources-so-called "defensive
modernization."55 Of course, the project, if it extends into hak ulayat areas,
will achieve precisely the opposite end. Communal title will be displaced and
new individual titles will be created. In the process, the project will
disenfranchise precisely those whom it is intended to help and at the same
time re-invent land interests in Indonesia in a fashion far more compatible
with government development policy.
The cynic might say that this would be an outcome that would be
perfectly satisfactory to the World Bank, given its natural interest in ensuring
its loans to Indonesia are repaid. In fairness, however, it should be
acknowledged that the Bank has urged recognition of hak ulayat in draft
legislation it has prepared. The Indonesian government has so far rejected its
proposals. 56 The test for the World Bank will be its reaction to the
government's position.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Government attempts to obliterate adat in Indonesia have largelv
failed. It is unlikely that Indonesia's predominant rural sector, where adat is
most influential, will be significantly reduced in size in the near future. The
economic base that underlies the social and cultural superstructure of adat
will persist far into the next century and perhaps the one after. It is also likely
that the current diversity of cultures among Indonesia's rural communities,
while perhaps waning, will remain largely intact. Indonesia in twenty years
will have much larger cities and the majority of Indonesians will live in them.
55 R. AYREs, BANKING ON THE POOR: THE WORLD BANK AND WORLD POVERTY (1983).

"6 Haverfield, supra, note 1.
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Nonetheless, if current population growth predictions are accurate, by 2020
the lifestyle of well in excess of a hundred million Indonesians will still be
largely regulated by adat.
In these circumstances, is the pluralism, dynamism-even the obscurity
(to outsiders)--of adat really such a mischief? Indonesia's ancient, complex,
and sophisticated system of adat land law is a far from inadequate solution
for one of the most ethnically and culturally plural nations on earth. The
technocrats of New Order "developmentalism" are attempting to force the
square surveyor's peg into the ancient and holistic "round" hole of tanah air,
Indonesia's traditional land and water. Are they manipulating the good
intentions of international aid donors in doing so? Either way, the result has
been a dysfunctional land law regime.
One solution is for the World Bank to take its attempts to obtain the
recognition of hak ulayat one step further. As a priority, it should halt
funding for the Land Administration Project until the Indonesian government
agrees to formally recognise hak ulayat as a registrable interest. Once this is
achieved, the Bank should also shift the focus of the project to exploring
means for accurately assessing and recording hak ulayat interests through
registration.

